Bond market vigilantes already have taken aim at Greece, Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Iceland, pushing government bond yields higher.

At this point, inflationary expectations will increase, long term government bond yields will rise, and the recovery will be crowded out.

Long term government bond yields are already very low, and a further reduction will not significantly change private agents borrowing costs.

While that could be contractionary, the gain in fiscal policy credibility might prevent a damaging spike in long term government bond yields.

The gaps between German bond yields and Italian and Greek yields are at record levels. The price of default insurance has tripled.

Frustrated investors would then dump their US Treasury securities. Bond yields would shoot up.

Otherwise, Treasury bond yields would be far higher, thwarting monetary expansion by the Fed.

The bond channel doesn t work when bond yields are already low and the credit channel doesn t work when banks hoard liquidity and velocity collapses.

A negative oil shock, together with rising government bond yields could clip the recovery s wings and lead to a significant further downturn in asset prices and in the real economy.

When that happens, inflationary expectations will mount, long term government bond yields will rise, mortgage rates and private market rates will increase, and one would end up with stagflation (inflation and recession).

Bond yields in southern Europe were rising, and a pervasive sense of apprehension and fear cloaked governments in European capitals.

French government bond interest rates fell 30 to record lows, less than 50 basis points above German government bond rates.

Investors subsequent efforts to price in the risk of a eurozone breakup not the volume of sovereign debt caused bond yields to spike.

Global stock markets have, overall, reached new highs. And credit markets show low spreads, while long term bond yields have fallen in most advanced economies.

Eventually, large monetized fiscal deficits will lead to a fiscal train wreck and or a rise in inflation expectations that could sharply increase long term government bond yields and crowd out a tentative and so far fragile economic recovery.

Long term inflation indexed bond yields have fallen to around 1 a year, or less, in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the eurozone.

Likewise, an IMF program for Ireland which seems increasingly likely will not bring down domestic bond yields and reopen credit markets to any kind of Irish borrower.

Europe, gripped by a tremendous banking and debt crisis, is not an attractive destination, and loose monetary policy in the US has produced ultra low bond yields there.

Euro accession and bull market convergence trades pushed bond yields in these countries toward the level of German bunds, with the ensuing credit boom supporting excessive consumption growth.

If the Republicans threats were credible, any news that increased the likelihood of a problem with the debt ceiling would send Treasury bond prices down and yields up.

The market s reaction was to send Spanish government bond rates even higher.

Real estate rental yields and stock market payouts are low, and real estate and stock prices may well fall as much as or more than bond prices if interest rates spike.

There is no other way to keep bond yields under control and banks functioning, and there is no ironclad guarantee that the reform programs needed to do the job will be approved.

It is also true that whenever Republicans rattle their sabers about the debt ceiling, and threaten not to raise it, the bond market yawns and there is no significant impact on yields.

The real reason inflation indexed bond yields are an interesting economic variable is that they report on a market in which both investors and borrowers know exactly what is coming, in real terms.

Not proceeding now with bank recapitalization and government bond purchases would similarly lead to disaster.

To allay anxiety about government profligacy, the ECB built conditionality into its bond purchase program.

If people are risk averse enough that increased fear of the future causes them to save more, rising global uncertainty will raise bond and stock prices, and lower interest rates and dividend and earnings yields.

Yields on government debt of peripheral eurozone countries are skyrocketing, because investors do not really know what the risks are.

A dollar bill is an IOU from the government, just like a Social Security Trust Fund bond is.

If foreign financing is not forthcoming, yields on US government debt will rise and the US economy will fall back into recession.

Good land yields its vegetation by the permission of its Lord . While the corrupted yields only the scanty .

But the evidence emerging from successive rounds of QE in the UK and the US suggests that while it did lower bond yields, the extra money was largely retained within the banking system, and never reached the real economy.

Economists like to subtract the nominal government bond yield from the inflation indexed bond yield of the same maturity to get a market estimate of the inflation rate from now to that maturity date.

Yields per hectare have been stagnating.

Bond offering

Proponents of OMT counter that the Treaty forbids only direct government bond purchases indirect purchases in secondary markets are allowed.

Three major factors underlie today s low yields.

By contrast, burning coal yields only C02.

When an elected government is under assault from the bond markets, it is essential for the political class to remain united.

These bonds may be seen as a hybrid of a single bond and a double bond, each bond in the ring identical to every other.

The Government appealed this decision, invoking a regulation that unilaterally stayed the immigration judge's bond decision until final resolution of the appeal.

The distinction between bond purchases from the government and from the banks that bought them from the government is a phony one that gives rise to myriad possibilities for circumvention.

Buying time for reform to work requires socialization of short term risk. There is no other way to keep bond yields under control and banks functioning, and there is no ironclad guarantee that the reform programs needed to do the job will be approved.

The current 30 year T bill yields 3.2 annually, which means that, unless the marginal bond buyer today is unusually averse to holding 30 year Treasuries, she anticipates that short term nominal T bill rates will average 1 per year over the next generation.