But EU institutions have not been entirely inactive.

Citizens, unsurprisingly, complained about the declining legitimacy of EU institutions.

But, as these institutions mature, a more coherent EU foreign policy should emerge.

With 27 members and no reform of its institutions and procedures, EU processes have become harrowingly inefficient.

Of course, competence and responsibility for arms export controls and licensing rests with member states, not EU institutions.

Those who believe that common interests and liberal institutions should define the EU would gain by this acceptance.

We need to assess what can be achieved at the national level and what EU institutions should do.

First, the Constitutional Treaty guarantees that the Union's institutions will respect the fundamental rights of everyone within the EU.

Will they agree to pool tax revenues so that EU level institutions can credibly take charge of financial stability?

After all, how else could it be full a member of all European organizations and institutions except the EU?

But, to do so, we will need to make EU institutions more efficient, with better regulation and a lower administrative burden. Common institutions are needed to ensure that all EU countries interests are protected, and to act as a bridge between eurozone and non eurozone member states.

Frankly, the functioning of the EU and its institutions during the crisis has been a part of the problem. For many people, EU decision making is opaque, inefficient, and removed from democratic control.

But, to do so, we will need to make EU institutions more efficient, with better regulation and a lower administrative burden.

To put that amount into perspective, the regular move of EU institutions between Brussels and Strasbourg costs 200 million per year.

The EU pledges to help set up Western type public institutions and to transform the Eastern economies through comprehensive free trade agreements.

But Germany s Constitutional Court can judge whether the actions of EU institutions are compatible with its constitution and the European Union treaties.

The democratic credentials of organizations like the EU are doubtful, and entirely absent in the case of the UN and other world institutions.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that there should be no joint EU guarantee each country would have to take care of its own institutions.

There would have to be two sets of EU institutions, one for the eurozone and another for non eurozone countries, although they would overlap.

Although the UK is not a eurozone member, its cooperation is crucial if EU institutions are to be used to solve the euro crisis.

Again, meetings, seminars, side events to official meetings, were as many occasions to lobby the International Financial Institutions, the EU, governments and official delegates.

While China is not about to dominate these institutions, in southern Africa it is regarded as a potential counterweight to the US and the EU.

Institutions are legitimized in part by their effectiveness, and the EU must recover its authority to defend common interests and harmonize them with national concerns.

By means of extensive reforms to the structure, operation, and decision making processes of EU institutions, the treaty enhances their effectiveness and enables greater dynamism.

Certainly, the EU will continue to exist and its institutions will continue to function, for better or worse, on the foundation of the Treaty of Nice.

Institutions, however, may be reformed if they no longer work, and this is exactly what the EU has been futilely trying to do for 20 years.

Common institutions are needed to ensure that all EU countries interests are protected, and to act as a bridge between eurozone and non eurozone member states.

This is the crux of the Lisbon Treaty, which is designed to usher in new institutions and mechanisms aimed at creating more politically cohesive EU external policies.

This double speak on the part of national political elites is perceived as such by voters, whose trust in both national and EU institutions is naturally declining.

The Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) created a new organizational structure for the EU and laid the foundations for political institutions equal to Europe s economic power.

For that reason, Europe now requires leadership not from a weak EU Commission or from any other European institutions, but from the capitals of its major member countries.

Moreover, for decades Turkey has been a responsible member of many European institutions, and there is no reason to believe that it would act differently in the EU.

From the current Russian regime s perspective, declarations that EU and NATO expansion is about spreading values, accountable institutions, and good governance, not military or economic competition, is beyond hypocritical.

As Trustees of Friends of Europe , we would urge the European institutions and EU political leaders to renew their efforts regarding both the Lisbon Treaty and the Lisbon Agenda.

The Lisbon Treaty offers a fundamental redesign of how the Union works, but, despite the pressing need to enhance EU institutions mobility and flexibility, it is still awaiting ratification.

The EU, after all, is composed of sovereign states that jealously guard their prerogatives while occasionally yielding some aspect of sovereignty to central institutions for mutually agreed upon purposes.

If Latin America is to become a strategic partner for the EU and a more attractive market for European companies, European institutions must become more open to the region s needs.

Thinking about the consequences that such a Europe would have on EU institutions, one must ask how the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Ministers would function.

It both sets the normative framework for EU policy and establishes institutions and procedures for policies on border controls, asylum, reception of migrants, and cooperation between judicial and police authorities.

Reform of a country s political and economic institutions and its accession to the EU and NATO usually go hand in hand, because the prospect of membership makes painful decisions electorally acceptable.

That sets the stage for three broad scenarios, each with implications for the European and global economy, the financial and banking system, and relations between the member states and EU institutions.

The EU would invite non EU states to do likewise

But, with that historic task now complete, European institutions need a new rationale. And with the EU, unlike other federations, lacking a common political destiny, that rationale must center on material benefits.

The current crisis has exposed the original lacunae and widening cracks in the compact between Europe s citizens and EU institutions, between Europe s north and south, and between its peoples and its elites.

(EU proposal)