Example 3 Determination of biological warfare agent production facilities

Thus, the positive verification of two liquid biological warfare agents found in munitions reduced the concern that Iraq had produced dry agent.

In particular the detection of the conversion of a legitimate biological facility for biological warfare purposes turned out to be especially difficult since such activities took place only for a short period of time, and the site required only minor adjustments for the production of a biological warfare agent.

Conversion of a legitimate facility for biological warfare purposes is difficult to detect, especially when such activities take place only for a short period of time, and when the site requires only very minor adjustments for the production of a biological warfare agent.

Al Fudaliyah was a legitimate civilian facility that was used for the production of the biological warfare agent aflatoxin without any significant modifications to its infrastructure.

Example 1 Uncovering the scope of Iraq's work on the chemical warfare agent VX

Iraq's main biological warfare agent production facility, Al Hakam, was built at a remote desert location (60 km west south west of Baghdad) in remarkably short time, during the period from March to December 1988.

No other facilities were declared in connection with its biological warfare programme.

Anthrax was first tested as a biological warfare agent by Unit 731 of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria during the 1930s some of this testing involved intentional infection of prisoners of war, thousands of whom died.

The most important lesson learned with regard to the experience of the foot and mouth disease vaccine plant is that Iraq indeed carried out large scale production of a biological warfare agent at a legitimate civilian facility.

Later investigations have shown that the transmitting agent in variant CJD shares identical biological properties with BSE s agent, supporting a causal relationship.

Two agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax, were selected as candidate biological warfare agents.

Although the inspectors believed that the facility could have been planned as the next stage in Iraq's biological warfare programme, no evidence of its actual involvement in Iraq's past biological warfare programme was found.

Although the inspectors believed that the facility could have been planned as the next stage in Iraq's biological warfare programme, no evidence of its involvement in biological warfare activities was found during that period.

NetLogo is widely used in agent based simulation in the biological and social sciences.

It is assumed that the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona develops vaccines and antidotes for chemical and biological warfare.

Following Iraq's admission in 1995 of the weaponization of Al Hussein warheads with biological warfare agent and their later unilateral destruction in 1991, inspectors sampled warhead fragments and obtained samples found to be positive for the DNA of Bacillus anthracis.

Early in 1988, Iraq also began field trials on the dissemination of biological warfare agents.

The possibility of discovering mobile biological warfare capability is assessed as still possible but very unlikely.

hand held devices for detecting and monitoring landmines, unexploded ordnance and chemical and biological warfare agents.

Similar experience was gained regarding another legitimate facility at Fudaliyah also utilized by Iraq's biological warfare programme.

No evidence was found that Iraq had developed these systems for the delivery of biological warfare agents.

By 1995, in the course of its continuing verification, UNSCOM collected sufficient evidence suggesting that Iraq's biological warfare programme had not been limited to research activities but had also included the production of several bulk biological warfare agents and, possibly, their weaponization.

Consequently, in July 1995, under pressure from the inspectors who had acquired procurement information related to the unexplained import of large quantities of growth media, Iraq finally admitted the past production of biological warfare agents at Al Hakam, a dedicated biological warfare facility.

By 1995, the inspectors had collected sufficient evidence to suggest that Iraq's biological warfare programme was not limited to research activities, as Iraq claimed, but had also included the production of bulk quantities of several biological warfare agents and, possibly, their weaponization.

After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, the biological weapons programme increased the production of bulk biological warfare agents and began to weaponize them.

The Biological Weapons Act 1975 prohibits any person from developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining any biological agent or toxin of a certain type contrary to peaceful purposes.

The College also welcomed the extensive presentations by UNMOVIC staff on monitoring of small quantities of chemical and biological warfare agents and assessments of sites in the biological area.

No evidence of its involvement in Iraq's biological warfare programme was found until Iraq declared its past involvement in 1995.

No indication of its involvement in Iraq's biological warfare programme arose until Iraq declared in August 1995 its past involvement.

As was subsequently explained by Iraq, it produced liquid bacterial biological warfare agents accepting a moderate risk of airborne contamination.

However, since all biological munitions were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq without United Nations supervision, it was not possible to determine whether weaponized biological warfare agents were in liquid or dry state.

A stressor is a chemical or biological agent, environmental condition, external stimulus or an event that causes stress to an organism.

Iraq also declared that it had weaponized bulk agent but had unilaterally destroyed all bulk agents and biological weapons in 1991.

The weapons included 25 special warheads for Al Hussein missiles and 157 R 400 aerial bombs, filled with biological warfare agents.

However, no samples of those fragments were taken for analysis until after Iraq admitted to the weaponization of biological warfare agents.

Forensic sampling and analysis of spray drying equipment present at Al Hakam in 1996 revealed no traces of biological warfare agents.

If a deception campaign is actively pursued, the probability of finding hard evidence of activities related to biological warfare is minimized.

These considerations were drawn from microbiological practices and standards familiar to the United Nations biological inspectors, who were considered to be some of the best scientists and engineers in the biological warfare field.

Iraq also provided information on other types of aerial and artillery munitions used in field trials with biological warfare agents or simulants.

In the absence of such conclusive evidence, it was difficult to assess that Al Hakam was a biological weapons production facility or that Iraq had produced bulk agent or had biological weapons, until 1995.

The assumptions regarding the unsuitability of Iraq's dedicated biological weapons production facilities were reinforced by the lack of evidence at the time that Iraq had progressed beyond research and development of biological warfare agents.

The dual use nature of these facilities mean that Australia, like any country with advanced biotechnological industries, could easily produce biological warfare agents.

In September 1947, Burnet was invited to join the chemical and biological warfare subcommittee of the New Weapons and Equipment Development Committee and subsequently prepared a secret report titled Note on War from a Biological Angle .

In order to account for the 157 declared R 400 biological bombs said to have been filled with various biological warfare agents, Iraq began a re excavation programme at Al Azzizziyah firing range in February 2003.