When the foreign share of debt grows, so do the political incentives to impose the costs of that debt on foreigners.

The debt ceiling absolutists grossly underestimate the massive adjustment costs of a self imposed sudden stop in debt finance.

Indeed, these debt service costs alone account for 22 of the Egyptian government s total expenditures.

The debate about austerity and the high cost of public debt is thus misleading on two accounts.

But will tax revenues rise fast enough to offset the escalating cost of servicing the government s mountain of debt?

In the event of sovereign defaults, moreover, the cost of bailing out the banks may far exceed the cost of issuing Eurobonds or instituting a reasonable transfer regime.

Investors need to be reassured that debt service costs are under control, and that debt volumes and deficit limits are firmly monitored in order to minimize default risks and strengthen banks ability to lay the groundwork for sustainable growth.

Higher debt service costs require higher tax rates, which in turn weaken incentives and reduce economic growth.

The costs of default depend on how messy things become when payments stop. What are the legal difficulties?

The cost of debt service adjusts automatically, without the severe disruption that results from loss of confidence, crisis, debt restructuring, and so forth.

When the implied liabilities of the Social Security and Medicare systems are added on, an unprecedented level of peacetime debt confronts the US.

Finally, the proposed better use of the IMF s gold holdings to finance the costs of debt relief seeks to raise up to 8 billion.

In the face of high systemic risk, private capital is leaving banks and the sovereign debt markets, causing governments borrowing costs to rise and bank capitalization to fall.

Even if Iraq is to bear more of the cost of its own reconstruction, there will have to be debt forgiveness, and this too requires international cooperation.

But hints of new fiscal imprudence or of backsliding on long term debt consolidation and reduction can drive up borrowing costs dramatically.

Optimists see it differently. Encouraged by sharp reductions in households debt service costs and a surprisingly steep fall in unemployment, they argue that the long nightmare has finally ended.

Central banks that buy sovereign debt issued by fiscal authorities offset market imposed discipline on borrowing costs, effectively subsidizing public sector profligacy.

Relative to the recent past, the cost of capital will increase, debt will be more expensive and less ubiquitous, and risk spreads will not return to pre crisis compressed levels.

And the cost of carrying the extra debt incurred is extraordinarily low 12 billion a year of extra taxes would be enough to finance the fiscal stimulus program at current interest rates.

What the market is saying is not that the economy has too much debt, but that it has too much private debt, which is why prices of corporate bonds are low and firms find financing expensive.

The love has been very tough indeed, generating rapid economic contraction, massive unemployment (upwards of 50 among young people), and continued fiscal deterioration, owing to rising debt service costs.

The results were quite similar unless entitlement costs are brought under control, the resulting rise in debt will cut US living standards by roughly 20 in a generation.

We hope that the G8 can help finalize these arrangements, and can help us ensure that the costs of debt relief are shared among all creditors, including those from the private sector.

Debt

The private sector can spend less and save more, but this would entail an immediate cost known as Keynes paradox of thrift declining economic output and rising debt as a share of GDP.

Sharp rises in sovereign, corporate, and interbank liquidity spreads will increase the cost of capital, and increases in risk aversion, volatility, and sovereign risk will undermine business, investor, and consumer confidence further.

Such opposition seems counter intuitive, given that the ECB s mere announcement of the OMT program calmed sovereign debt markets and reduced borrowing costs in peripheral countries.

French production costs are high, but Greek costs are higher.

Higher deficits, moreover, would cause the ratio of debt to GDP to rise from its already high level, which implies greater debt service costs and, therefore, even larger deficits.

Operating costs

Investment costs

Debt and Delusion

Debt and Democracy

The Debt Delusion

Debt relief

The country simply cannot keep on piling debt upon debt.

If Europe particularly the European Central Bank were to borrow, and re lend the proceeds, the costs of servicing Europe s debt would fall, creating room for the kinds of expenditure that would promote growth and employment.

But the steep fall in the value of Italian and Spanish banks holdings of government debt, combined with mounting bad loans as a result of recessions exacerbated by punitive borrowing costs, is forcing the banks to rein in business lending further.

The change in a country s debt burden reflects the size of its primary budget balance (the balance minus interest payments) as a share of GDP, as well as the difference between its borrowing costs and its GDP growth rate.

The Costs of Grexit

Transaction costs and efficiency

The Cost of Dick Cheney

Measuring the Costs of Too Big To Fail

Travel costs 24.0

Travel costs 76.0