So the EU must harmonize its policies with poorer countries.

The EU is equally unlikely to change dramatically its development aid policies towards Pakistan.

Credible domestic and EU wide policies are needed to stabilize the situation. Neither is forthcoming.

The EU, in particular, should engage the region with clearer, more coordinated, and more effective policies.

But that would mean a substantial change in the direction of EU social policies, including revision of the draft constitution.

She would also be willing to work on institutional reforms aimed at closer coordination of EU member states economic policies.

The EU emphasized the importance of studying further the policies and regional agreements that could foster South South investment flows.

Thus, policies designed to preserve the financial system and the euro are transforming the EU into the opposite of an open society.

The EU did not just implement a single carbon market in order to meet its target for CO2 emissions. Instead, the EU made a bad deal a lot costlier through a host of partly contradictory policies.

And it would interfere much less with national sovereignty than would the subordination of fiscal policies to an EU or eurozone wide authority.

The challenge now for EU leaders is not to repackage old policies, but to express a collective vision and will to act together.

So the primary difference between the US and the EU was not the Kyoto Protocol or the EU s climate policies, but external factors. The European Environment Agency still maintains that the EU will meet its 2012 target.

In other words, the poor design of EU climate policies triples the cost and prevents only three cents of climate damage per dollar spent.

For the French, as for all Europeans, the EU is not a foreign entity, and its decisions are an integral part of domestic policies.

Of course, a common EU security strategy is not meant to undermine the rights of individual member states to choose their internal energy policies.

Once the EU binds its aid to some states to their adoption of certain policies, it should be equally accountable for the outcome of those policies. Democratically addressing the consequences of financial interdependence requires both a European voice on individual states policies and a correspondent European democratic accountability.

As Eastern European countries become more closely integrated into the EU, they increasingly have to calculate the impact of their policies on relations with Europe.

So a eurozone that needs fiscal austerity, structural reforms, and appropriate macroeconomic and financial policies is weakened politically at both the EU and national levels.

The current crisis has, however, also shown that the Council of Finance Ministers (Ecofin) is unable to assert such control over EU member states fiscal policies.

Still, the UK has played a leading role in designing key EU policies, including measures concerning the single market, overseas development aid, trade, and climate change.

These policies were undertaken at a time when the EU economy was doing well and one hopes with full knowledge that they would have significant costs.

But, once again, EU leaders responded by concluding the opposite the Lisbon Agenda s failure was interpreted as justifying still more harmonization and centralization of national policies.

The EU has an agency called Frontex to coordinate and strengthen national border control policies. But governments have not allowed it to issue directives to national agencies.

The larger the EU gets, the greater its need for coordinated and coherent policies, and the harder it becomes to rally all members around a common position.

This is the crux of the Lisbon Treaty, which is designed to usher in new institutions and mechanisms aimed at creating more politically cohesive EU external policies.

Realistic restrictions in Europe can be adopted only by taking into account migration spillovers across jurisdictions, which requires implementing policies that are agreed at the EU level.

Though country to country engagement with Asia s rising powers may be tempting, and while China often prefers bilateral dealings, renationalization of EU members foreign policies would be counterproductive.

In all these instances, national policies have had severe repercussions for other EU states. European issues were governed at a national level, and other Europeans paid the price.

Taking into account such poor policies and averaging all macroeconomic models, the EU is more likely to pay around 280 billion per year to avert 10 billion in damage.

These variations are rooted in differences in national policies, which highlights the fundamental flaw in the idea that solutions to European countries problems lie mainly at the EU level.

But nor should they allow the US or the EU to use trade sanctions or other pressure to alter foreign countries labor market rules, environmen tal policies, or financial regulations.

Such a sea change would have profound implications for French policies across a broad spectrum, from internal EU issues and economics to foreign policy and Europe s role in the world.

As with the single market program of the 1980 s, the Commission could be in charge of overseeing a convergence of national economic policies, within certain parameters, throughout the EU.

It both sets the normative framework for EU policy and establishes institutions and procedures for policies on border controls, asylum, reception of migrants, and cooperation between judicial and police authorities.

For example, Turkey is closer to the EU in its policies toward Iraq and Palestine, yet follows a line similar to that of the US in the Balkans and Cyprus.

Again, I think that the EU is leading the way in developing countries with development policies that promote broad based rural economic growth by boosting primary production and increasing its efficiency.

The fact is that citizens in every EU member country are increasingly aware that national policies are determined by decision making at the European level, over which they have little influence.

The EU would invite non EU states to do likewise

It is important to examine this approach, not only because the EU is pursuing the world s largest and most ambitious climate policy, but also because other climate policies suffer from similar shortcomings.

But the sad reality is that political, social, and economic pressures tend to push EU members and citizens in opposing directions shared histories, it seems, are an insufficient basis for shared policies.

For starters, the coherence of Europe s policies toward Russia improved the EU threatened to use the World Trade Organization s dispute settlement mechanism when the Kremlin announced new protectionist measures in late 2012.

Without common economic and financial policies, coordinated at least between the members of the euro zone, the cohesion of the common currency and the EU indeed, their very existence are in unprecedented danger.

But this idea threatens current beneficiaries of EU redistributive policies, namely Spain (which now gets over a third of Union cohesion funds) and Greece (which gets about a fifth), as well as Ireland.

In the context of that draft resolution, the EU would like to emphasize its and other States' well known position on the importance of respect for human rights in all counter terrorism policies.

(EU proposal)