It then cites global current account imbalances, particularly the US external deficit, describing it as unprecedented for a reserve currency country to have a current account deficit of such magnitude.

Rebalancing also involves a global demand switch from external deficit countries to those running large current account surpluses.

A vicious circle of public finance deficits, current account gaps, worsening external debt dynamics, and stagnating growth can then set in.

As these countries posted current account deficits, northern European countries accumulated current account surpluses, exposing a widening competitiveness gap.

For them, the Chinese current account surplus and its mirror image, the US current account deficit, are the central problem.

Since China s external surplus is already down to less than 2 of GDP, a decline in domestic saving could result in China beginning to run a current account deficit.

Countries that ran significant current account surpluses, built up large reserves, and fixed (or heavily managed) their exchange rates in order to support the first two objectives appeared to secure external stability.

These countries combined current account deficit matches Germany s surplus almost exactly. (The eurozone s aggregate current account with the rest of the world is balanced.)

Germany s enormous current account surplus aggravates their problems further.

Much is made of Germany s large current account surpluses.

Delay has made current account rebalancing via RMB appreciation costly.

The renminbi s exchange rate, then, is really a secondary factor in China s external account.

This outlook for the current account balance does not depend on what happens to the renminbi s exchange rate against other currencies. The saving investment imbalance is fundamental, and it alone determines a country s external position.

Moreover, the economies that managed to narrow their external gaps with the US substantially after World War II, notably Germany, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, ran current account surpluses throughout their rapid growth periods.

The ESM is a sure way to bring Europe to its knees, because the longer bailout loans continue, the longer the GIPS current account deficits will persist, and the more their external debts will grow.

Given that Greece had a current account deficit close to 10 of GDP in 2010, a drop in imported consumption goods of that magnitude seems to be needed before the country s external debt can be stabilized.

Germany now has a current account surplus of about 215 billion a year, while the rest of the eurozone is running a current account deficit of about 140 billion.

In turn, this risks weakening both the government s fiscal position and the economy s external account.

Its current account is sliding into an ever deeper deficit hole.

The US current account deficit and the Asian surplus will shrink.

The world s current account balances must ultimately sum up to zero.

According to the so called Lawson Doctrine, rising current account deficits and external indebtedness generated by the private (as opposed to the public) sector are immune to the dangers that proved so destructive in the early 1980s.

For the most part, India s current growth slowdown and its fiscal and current account deficits are not structural problems.

Since a country s current account surplus is the difference between its national saving and its national investment, China s current account surplus is likely to continue to shrink in the coming years.

Many emerging markets have run current account surpluses for the first time.

They argue that current account balances reflect national savings and investment rates.

Current Account Deficit , Virginia Association of Economics, Richmond, Virginia, 10 March 2005.

First, countries with current account surpluses such as Germany, Japan and China must recognize that their own growth (and that of others) depends on reducing the global savings investment imbalance, which will result in narrowing external deficits elsewhere.

In the run up to the financial crisis, the US external deficit was soaking up almost 70 of the excess funds saved by China, Japan, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and all the countries with current account surpluses combined.

But Asia cannot be complacent financial systems remain fragile economies are burdened with high fiscal and current account deficits and Asia remains too heavily dependent on North American and European export markets, increasing its vulnerability to external shocks.

In Spain, the counterpart to the current account deficit was private sector borrowing.

An increase in gold imports placed further pressure on the current account balance.

SINGAPORE These days everyone seems to want to run a current account surplus.

And with that lower saving rate will come a smaller current account surplus.

Not surprisingly, those economies with current account deficits are feeling the heat first.

The current account deficit has been almost eliminated, and the banking crisis contained.

What makes this perverse is that Germany runs a huge current account surplus.

Oil exporters aside, countries running current account surpluses, such as China, Germany, and Japan, have stronger manufacturing sectors relative to their financial sectors, while the relationship is reversed for countries running external deficits, such as the US and the United Kingdom.

Both for the RPTC and BMS, the ongoing status report on the balances and utilization of the funds on the special account will be reported after the completion of the current biennium along with the report of the External Auditor.

It is hard to argue that the RMB is not undervalued, given China s large and persistent current account and capital account surpluses.

In particular, the issuance and subsequent repayment of external debt can account for large swings in such liabilities.

Given China s massive current account surplus (12 of GDP), the renminbi is still undervalued.

Rwanda s current account has deteriorated steadily, with the deficit now exceeding 10 of GDP.

On top of this is the almost certain unwinding of global current account imbalances.

Germany had moved to current account convertibility in 1958, but Japan only in 1964.