Two agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax, were selected as candidate biological warfare agents.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and consequently associated domestic legislation do not specify schedules' of biological agents that could constitute biological weapons.

Code of Conduct for the Import and Release of Exotic Biological Control Agents

In addition, no evidence of biological munitions filled with dry agents was found.

However, in the biological area the concept of verification also includes the fact that biological agents are self replicating and that large amounts of bulk agents can be produced from a single vial of seed stock.

Early in 1988, Iraq also began field trials on the dissemination of biological warfare agents.

In particular, section 8 of the Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act places a restriction on the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of certain biological agents and toxins and biological weapons.

Molecular motors are biological molecular machines that are the essential agents of movement in living organisms.

hand held devices for detecting and monitoring landmines, unexploded ordnance and chemical and biological warfare agents.

The biological weapons programme also began research on other agents, including ricin toxin and Clostridium botulinum spores.

No evidence was found that Iraq had developed these systems for the delivery of biological warfare agents.

Work with biological agents including human pathogens that could be used as biological weapons must be notified to or permitted by SWEA, which is the supervisory authority.

After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, the biological weapons programme increased the production of bulk biological warfare agents and began to weaponize them.

The College also welcomed the extensive presentations by UNMOVIC staff on monitoring of small quantities of chemical and biological warfare agents and assessments of sites in the biological area.

Guidance for Local Authorities have been developed on the deliberate release of chemicals and biological, radioactive and nuclear agents.

The national authority for control of handling of work with biological agents is the Swedish Work Environment Authority (SWEA).

AFS 2000 5 regulates classification of genetically modified biological agents and provides bio safety standards for genetic engineering activities work.

As was subsequently explained by Iraq, it produced liquid bacterial biological warfare agents accepting a moderate risk of airborne contamination.

However, since all biological munitions were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq without United Nations supervision, it was not possible to determine whether weaponized biological warfare agents were in liquid or dry state.

However, they were based on elevated expectations on the part of the inspectors regarding the degree of efficiency of Iraq's biological warfare programme, assuming possible production of viral agents and dried bacterial agents.

Of note were refinements to export control lists, including the addition of specific aerosol sprayers suitable for dispersal of biological agents.

Iraq also declared that it had weaponized bulk agent but had unilaterally destroyed all bulk agents and biological weapons in 1991.

The weapons included 25 special warheads for Al Hussein missiles and 157 R 400 aerial bombs, filled with biological warfare agents.

However, no samples of those fragments were taken for analysis until after Iraq admitted to the weaponization of biological warfare agents.

Forensic sampling and analysis of spray drying equipment present at Al Hakam in 1996 revealed no traces of biological warfare agents.

UNMOVIC carried out technical seminars in New York on new techniques in detection of early protein markers for chemical and biological agents.

Iraq also provided information on other types of aerial and artillery munitions used in field trials with biological warfare agents or simulants.

Thus, the positive verification of two liquid biological warfare agents found in munitions reduced the concern that Iraq had produced dry agent.

The assumptions regarding the unsuitability of Iraq's dedicated biological weapons production facilities were reinforced by the lack of evidence at the time that Iraq had progressed beyond research and development of biological warfare agents.

The dual use nature of these facilities mean that Australia, like any country with advanced biotechnological industries, could easily produce biological warfare agents.

In order to account for the 157 declared R 400 biological bombs said to have been filled with various biological warfare agents, Iraq began a re excavation programme at Al Azzizziyah firing range in February 2003.

The act, which will function to make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire and or use biological weapons, is framework legislation that streamlines existing laws that deal peripherally with biological weapons issues and thus provides a more complete legal basis for the regulation of dual use biological agents.

For related legislation, see the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies.

It remains as relevant today as ever and is the cornerstone of our efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins from being developed as weapons.

With respect to weaponization, Iraq declared that warheads for Al Hussein missiles and R 400 aerial bombs had been filled with liquid biological warfare agents.

Under the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 (as amended), regulation 7(10) Schedule 3 paragraph 5 requires notification to HSE of Hazard Groups 2, 3 and 4 biological agents (i.e. non GM agents) before use for first time.

As was subsequently learned, Iraq produced bacterial biological warfare agents at Al Hakam with a moderate risk of airborne contamination due to the generation of aerosols.

Together with State and Territory Governments, the Australian Government has launched a process to review laws and regulations governing the security of biological agents in Australia.

A likely outcome of this review is the development of a comprehensive legislative regime to regulate the storage, possession, use and transport of hazardous biological agents.

By 1995, in the course of its continuing verification, UNSCOM collected sufficient evidence suggesting that Iraq's biological warfare programme had not been limited to research activities but had also included the production of several bulk biological warfare agents and, possibly, their weaponization.

Consequently, in July 1995, under pressure from the inspectors who had acquired procurement information related to the unexplained import of large quantities of growth media, Iraq finally admitted the past production of biological warfare agents at Al Hakam, a dedicated biological warfare facility.

By 1995, the inspectors had collected sufficient evidence to suggest that Iraq's biological warfare programme was not limited to research activities, as Iraq claimed, but had also included the production of bulk quantities of several biological warfare agents and, possibly, their weaponization.

626 1994 (article 87) requires relevant facilities to establish and update a register indicating the staff carrying out activities with biological agents listed in groups 3 and 4.

The Act also covers domestic transfers of toxins and includes packing requirements for transfer of these biological agents and toxins as well as bio safety requirements for transfer.

Rather, any biological agents could be considered a weapon if they are 'of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes'.