Regulators proved unable to forecast and prevent the crisis.

There was also bureaucratic resistance from existing regulators.

Japan s nuclear regulator did not enforce stricter security rules.

Regulators generally turned a blind eye to these suspicions.

So the mutual fund industry had the regulators all to itself.

We cannot merely rely on regulators to do the right thing.

Regulators should insist that traded derivatives are homogenous, standardized, and transparent.

Test methods are published by regulators or can be included in specifications or contracts.

Regulators may also have to revive old tools.

To enforce the statute, regulators periodically examine banks for CRA compliance.

Regulators could encourage each bank to sell part of its toxic portfolio and extrapolate the portfolio s value from the price obtained in such a sale, or they could attempt to estimate the portfolio s value as well as they can on their own.

So government regulators and ultimately all of us are caught between a rock and a hard place. Regulate in haste, repent at leisure.

Regulators have struggled with the problem for years without finding a solution.

Under the Senate s approach, regulators would create rules under which an independent regulatory board would choose raters.

Consequently, relying on low failure probabilities, national policies, the caution of private actors, and monitoring by regulators seems to be insufficient to prevent catastrophe.

Regulators relied mainly on examination of individual loans rather than capital to asset ratios.

But even the financial stress tests conducted by regulators did not require the banks to acknowledge that inconvenient truth.

But, prior to both Japan s nuclear crisis and the financial crisis, regulators were unable to prevent the risk.

As long as they manage their risks properly, regulators should be happy.

It is the job of regulators to ensure that no one is ever granted such a license.

Moreover, only the regulators can examine the dossiers, which are highly confidential.

Unfortunately, regulators do not even appear to be learning from the current crisis in order to prevent the next one.

But I am nervous about the idea that regulators are best placed to determine the future shape of markets.

Nor has a single criminal financier gambler, who misled the financial regulators with fudged figures, been brought to justice.

As national regulators seek to protect their own banks, they may hurt the banking systems of other countries.

But this ignores the possibility that regulators may have started to enforce the CRA rigorously only later.

In other words, he clearly believed that regulation created artificial barriers, and that competition between jurisdictions that is, between regulators was to be welcomed.

From a regulator s perspective, this is a powerful argument for requiring higher capital to constrain the risk that banks can take on.

Implementation depends on regulators some of whom are very good, while others remain in thrall to the big Wall Street banks.

Austrian, Italian, and Swiss regulators, seeing that their banks assets and liabilities were in their own currencies, looked the other way.

Regulators can do a great deal, but they need political direction from the highest level in order to make genuine progress.

If they over constrain the financial sector, risk may migrate outside the regulatory frontier, where it will be harder to measure and monitor.

The tighter their controls on risk in banks, the more frontier police the regulators will need.

Regulators have proposed steep hikes a Bank of England study, for example, suggested a more than three fold increase.

The accelerating speed of innovation seems to be outstripping government regulators capacity to deal with risks, much less anticipate them.

Many argue that regulations protect small domestic firms against undue competition from large foreign firms. But the truth is that regulations are stifling even for domestic competition.

Many argue that regulations protect small domestic firms against undue competition from large foreign firms.

Other regulators did no better in predicting this crisis, and are even less suited to prevent the next.

Now regulators are discouraging such cross border business, leading to a process with the ugly new name of de euroization.

In Europe since May 2004, all clinical trials in the 25 nations of the EU must conform to the European Directive (ED) issued in 2001 at the behest of pharmaceutical industry. Each country s regulatory body will have to issue their own regulations that are within the bound the Directive.

The Obama administration s proposed measures would simply create regulatory confusion, one of them complained.

Lenders to banks will not bother worrying about what kinds of gambles and investments financial institutions are making, or whether regulation is effective.

Glass Steagall also strengthened regulators ability to clamp down on lending for real estate and stock market speculation.

This entails preventing administrative abuses, establishing a level playing field for SOEs and other companies, and divorcing regulators from regulated entities.

This point is used to bolster a third argument large institutions have undue political influence and thus capture their regulators.