Spanish borrowing costs are also rising.

Meanwhile, high domestic borrowing costs are undermining private investment.

In these circumstances, continuing to raise borrowing costs would be a mistake.

In nominal terms, Italian and Spanish borrowing costs are indeed comparable to the levels of the late 1990 s.

Eurobonds would cut borrowing costs for the European Union s two large troubled members.

The result was a dramatic reduction in the British state s borrowing costs and the emergence of a well functioning capital market, which caused private borrowing costs to fall as well.

Too many big investors can no longer meet their margin calls, while borrowing costs have risen sharply.

The steady increase in production costs, partly attributable to high borrowing costs, is squeezing enterprises profit margins of small and medium sized enterprises in particular.

But eurozone members that currently benefit from exceptionally low borrowing costs Germany, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, France maintain that Italian and Spanish borrowing costs largely reflect these countries failure to reform their economies and strengthen their public finances.

The important exception to this pattern is Germany, which was accustomed to low borrowing costs even before it entered the eurozone.

But this solution raised the cost of new borrowing, so France began to consider the British model.

And raising borrowing costs for governments with dangerously heavy debts thereby discouraging them from further borrowing is precisely what we should want to do.

A reduction in borrowing costs constituted a powerful motive in the 1990 s for southern European governments to join the monetary union.

During the last 20 years, economic growth has been based on rising asset prices and declining borrowing costs for consumers and companies.

The low costs of finance facilitated global investment, thereby contributing to the acceleration of global growth in 2004.

Borrowing costs fell dramatically for the governments of Italy and Spain stock markets rallied and the recent decline in the external value of the euro was suddenly checked.

Debtor countries pay substantial risk premiums to finance their debt, which is reflected in their high economy wide borrowing costs.

In a push to reduce the cost of borrowing, the Fed purchased long term assets in the market, injecting liquidity into the financial system.

The alternative is either a sovereign debt crisis, followed by a destructive spike in borrowing costs, or a growing burden for subsequent generations of taxpayers.

Savers were repressed in order to lower the costs of credit for debtors (including governments) and those seeking to borrow for business expansion.

The argument is simple All economies have both borrowers and savers, and changes in the cost of borrowing (or the return to saving) affect them differently.

Long term government bond yields are already very low, and a further reduction will not significantly change private agents borrowing costs.

The Germans fear that such innovations would lead to a rise in domestic borrowing costs, and to direct and indirect fiscal transfers to poorer countries.

By mid July, however, the cost of borrowing for Spain and Italy was nearing four points, and France s borrowing conditions were rapidly deteriorating.

The advent of the euro was a seeming boon, because it reduced borrowing costs and allowed countries to create jobs through debt financed spending.

When the difference between borrowing costs and growth becomes too large, the primary budget surpluses required to stop debt from increasing become impossible to achieve.

This propped up the dollar and reduced the cost of borrowing for US households, encouraging them to live beyond their means.

In the face of high systemic risk, private capital is leaving banks and the sovereign debt markets, causing governments borrowing costs to rise and bank capitalization to fall.

Their borrowing costs fell as they locked their currencies into a union with countries Germany, in particular with a stronger reputation for stability.

Interest rate spreads for Italy and Spain are widening again, while borrowing costs for Portugal and Greece remained high all along.

Their finance ministers, while euphoric at their countries record low borrowing costs, must have understood that it might not last.

This partly reflects borrowing cost differentials. If the local interest rate is 17 per year and the dollar interest rate is 2 , it still makes sense to borrow in dollars as long as the domestic currency is expected to depreciate 15 or less.

Reducing borrowing costs without unleashing inflation was one of the main challenges faced by President Dilma Rousseff when she took office at the beginning of that year.

Time and again, banks woes have affected governments borrowing costs, and concerns over governments solvency have affected banks balance sheets.

But hints of new fiscal imprudence or of backsliding on long term debt consolidation and reduction can drive up borrowing costs dramatically.

The fundamental problem for Greece is its bloated fiscal commitments, enabled by lower borrowing costs when it joined the euro.

The polarization of borrowing costs has politically explosive distributional effects Germany is borrowing and refinancing its existing debt at artificially low interest rates.

With that sentence, Draghi eliminated the perceived re denomination tail risk that was highest in the case of Greece, but that was driving up borrowing costs in Spain, Italy, and Portugal as well.

Central banks that buy sovereign debt issued by fiscal authorities offset market imposed discipline on borrowing costs, effectively subsidizing public sector profligacy.

Meanwhile financial fragmentation within the eurozone continues Spain, and to a lesser extent Italy, suffers a seemingly irresistible rise in borrowing costs and political strains grow more visible.

This is what we see in the United Kingdom and the United States, where borrowing costs remain at all time lows, despite both countries weak public finances and poor growth prospects.

That way, if the economy needed another targeted fiscal stimulus in the short run, financial markets would not respond by driving up borrowing costs.

NEW YORK The risks facing the eurozone have been reduced since the summer, when a Greek exit looked imminent and borrowing costs for Spain and Italy reached new and unsustainable heights.

In Europe, that means agreeing on burden sharing for re capitalizing countries where deficits and debt have cut off market access or led to prohibitively high borrowing costs.

Because the ECB has already been using its balance sheet to help bring down borrowing costs in the eurozone s periphery, it has been cautious in its approach to monetary easing.