It also could alert both consumers and competition officials to the possible existence of a cartel.

This homogeneity makes it easier for sellers to agree on the terms of a cartel agreement.

Got the job done, killed several men... all known drug traffickers with the Vallejo Cartel.

The fine was the third largest imposed to date by the Turkish agency.

In Colombia we call these new actors 'bacrim', criminal bands servicing drug trafficking, the armies of mafia cartels.

The case descriptions also include a few in which the circumstantial evidence was insufficient.

In several cases described above, the evidence of a cartel agreement was only circumstantial.

Once we change those two things if you say the Africans are poor and they need poverty reduction, you have the international cartel of good intentions moving onto the continent, with what?

In most instances, the best sources of information about possible unlawful conduct in the marketplace are market participants themselves if a seller's cartel is suspected, buyers if a buyer's cartel is suspected (which often occurs in the agricultural sector), sellers.

Complainants usually do not possess enough evidence to prove that a cartel exists, but without their initiative, many cartel prosecutions would never begin.

As of 1999, the competition agencies had prosecuted only one cartel case under the country's competition law, which was enacted in 1988.

The infringement, carried out as part of an international cartel, was the longest operating cartel in Hungary, lasting from 1991 until 2003.

Once we change those two things if you say the Africans are poor and they need poverty reduction, you have the international cartel of good intentions moving onto the continent, with what?

In many countries it is legally possible to sustain a cartel prosecution without evidence of direct agreement, but it is risky to try to do so.

There may be a temptation to undertake economic studies of market behaviour pricing, for example, or cost structures in order to find conduct that suggests cartel activity.

Three cement companies, all subsidiaries of large multinational companies, were fined a total of EUR 28,500,000 for their participation in a cement cartel.

A Chilean court declined to find a cartel agreement, citing the lack of direct evidence of agreement, but it did order that the processors take certain measures to increase transparency in their dealings.

The programme should apply both to situations in which the competition agency has no information about a cartel and those in which an investigation has already begun.

The optimal fine for this purpose is a multiple of the actual gain, because not every cartel is discovered and prosecuted, a factor that businesspeople take into account in deciding whether to engage in a cartel.

Four suppliers of liquid oxygen for medical uses were fined a total of US 24.2 million for their participation in a cartel lasting five years, from 1997 to 2002.

As the secretariat was advised during consultations with experts, imposing the requirement of binding bids may be regarded as an effective tool against potential abuses in the ERA, such as by phantom bidders, or members of a cartel who may keep bids artificially high.

As described above, in the Empagran case, several developed countries successfully argued against intervention by United States courts in respect of injury to these countries' markets from an international cartel, on the grounds that this would undermine their own antitrust enforcement and amnesty programmes.