Example 3 Determination of biological warfare agent production facilities

No evidence was found that Iraq had developed these systems for the delivery of biological warfare agents.

Thus, the positive verification of two liquid biological warfare agents found in munitions reduced the concern that Iraq had produced dry agent.

Code of Conduct for the Import and Release of Exotic Biological Control Agents

However, no samples of those fragments were taken for analysis until after Iraq admitted to the weaponization of biological warfare agents.

The assumptions regarding the unsuitability of Iraq's dedicated biological weapons production facilities were reinforced by the lack of evidence at the time that Iraq had progressed beyond research and development of biological warfare agents.

Several samples taken by the inspectors from different pieces of equipment at Al Hakam were analysed by one outside national laboratory and were reported as negative for the presence of biological warfare agents.

Several samples taken by the inspectors from different pieces of equipment at Al Hakam were analysed by one outside national laboratory and were reported to be negative for the presence of biological warfare agents.

Conversion of a legitimate facility for biological warfare purposes is difficult to detect, especially when such activities take place only for a short period of time, and when the site requires only very minor adjustments for the production of a biological warfare agent.

In particular the detection of the conversion of a legitimate biological facility for biological warfare purposes turned out to be especially difficult since such activities took place only for a short period of time, and the site required only minor adjustments for the production of a biological warfare agent.

In order to account for the 157 declared R 400 biological bombs said to have been filled with various biological warfare agents, Iraq began a re excavation programme at Al Azzizziyah firing range in February 2003.

Two agents, botulinum toxin and anthrax, were selected as candidate biological warfare agents.

However, since all biological munitions were destroyed unilaterally by Iraq without United Nations supervision, it was not possible to determine whether weaponized biological warfare agents were in liquid or dry state.

As a consequence, the issue remains part of the residue of uncertainty with respect to the continued existence in Iraq of seed stocks that could possibly be used in the future for the production of biological warfare agents.

Early in 1988, Iraq also began field trials on the dissemination of biological warfare agents.

After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, the biological weapons programme increased the production of bulk biological warfare agents and began to weaponize them.

Consequently, in July 1995, under pressure from the inspectors who had acquired procurement information related to the unexplained import of large quantities of growth media, Iraq finally admitted the past production of biological warfare agents at Al Hakam, a dedicated biological warfare facility.

By 1995, the inspectors had collected sufficient evidence to suggest that Iraq's biological warfare programme was not limited to research activities, as Iraq claimed, but had also included the production of bulk quantities of several biological warfare agents and, possibly, their weaponization.

After the defection of Hussein Kamel from Iraq in August 1995, Iraq further admitted that biological warfare agents had also been produced at two other civilian facilities, the foot and mouth disease vaccine plant at Al Dawrah and Al Fudaliyah.

Consequently, in July 1995, under pressure from United Nations inspectors who had been investigating, inter alia, the material balance of imported growth media, Iraq finally admitted the past bulk production of biological warfare agents at Al Hakam.

The biological weapons programme also began research on other agents, including ricin toxin and Clostridium botulinum spores.

Prior to the arrival of international inspectors, Iraq cleaned all sites involved in the production of biological warfare agents, removed evidence of past activities, including relevant documents and records, reconfigured equipment, decontaminated and renovated buildings and structures and prepared convincing cover stories.

World War I The causes of World War I included many factors, including the conflicts and antagonisms of the four decades leading up to the war.

By 1995, in the course of its continuing verification, UNSCOM collected sufficient evidence suggesting that Iraq's biological warfare programme had not been limited to research activities but had also included the production of several bulk biological warfare agents and, possibly, their weaponization.

In 1995, Iraq declared two projects carried out in 1990 to investigate the modification of a MiG 21 fighter aircraft into an unmanned aerial vehicle and the conversion of a Mirage F 1 drop tank for the dissemination of biological warfare agents.

Al Fudaliyah was a legitimate civilian facility that was used for the production of the biological warfare agent aflatoxin without any significant modifications to its infrastructure.

United Nations inspectors, who visited the plant from September 1991 to 1995, identified capabilities existing at the facility to produce biological warfare agents, but concluded that the site was a legitimate facility since no modifications to its original design had been made by Iraq.

Considerations related to the low level of biological containment were major factors in the initial perception of the unsuitability of Iraq's dedicated biological weapons production facilities for the production of pathogens.

Poverty factors affect different categories differently, directly or indirectly, individually or in combination (war, transition, post war political and social division).

It is assumed that the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona develops vaccines and antidotes for chemical and biological warfare.

The weapons included 25 special warheads for Al Hussein missiles and 157 R 400 aerial bombs, filled with biological warfare agents.

That made the crisis more severe than any since World War II.

However, they were based on elevated expectations on the part of the inspectors regarding the degree of efficiency of Iraq's biological warfare programme, assuming possible production of viral agents and dried bacterial agents.

With respect to weaponization, Iraq declared that warheads for Al Hussein missiles and R 400 aerial bombs had been filled with liquid biological warfare agents.

At the end of 1987, the scope of the biological weapons work was further expanded and research into additional bacterial agents, such as Clostridium perfringens and fungal toxins, such as trichothecene mycotoxins, was carried out.

Forensic sampling and analysis of spray drying equipment present at Al Hakam in 1996 revealed no traces of biological warfare agents.

Biological Weapons

Iraq also provided information on other types of aerial and artillery munitions used in field trials with biological warfare agents or simulants.

(i) Biological weapons

Biological Weapons Convention

Biological and nuclear weapons Albania acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention on June 3, 1992, banning biological weapons.

In the absence of such conclusive evidence, it was difficult to assess that Al Hakam was a biological weapons production facility or that Iraq had produced bulk agent or had biological weapons, until 1995.

The aim is to prevent submunitions from becoming explosive remnants of war, which constitute real risk factors for civilian populations once conflicts end.

Three main factors affect the course of development, namely, war, the uncertainty created by political tension and how evenly the income and wealth of a society is distributed among its different strata.

There are many factors.