The author's allegation that no judicial body ever responded substantively to his defence relating to the tapped telephone calls with his lawyer was unfounded.

2.5 On appeal, the author's defence counsel argued that not all records of the tapped telephone calls, which should have been destroyed pursuant to section 125h, paragraph 2, had in fact been destroyed.

6.7 The Committee considers that the author has substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, that the interception of telephone conversations between him and his lawyer, as well as the State party's failure to destroy the recordings of certain tapped calls, may raise issues under article 17 of the Covenant.

did not disproportionately affect his right to communicate with his lawyer in conditions ensuring full respect for the confidentiality of the communications between them, as the District Court distinguished between tapped conversations in which A.T.M.M.

4.8 The State party argues that the interference with the author's right to privacy pursued a legitimate purpose (combating crime) and was proportionate, as the District Court ensured that the tapped conversations, in which Mr. A.T.M.M.

As the right to privacy implies that every individual should have the right to request rectification or elimination of incorrect personal data in files controlled by public authorities, the Committee considers that the separate storage of the recordings of the author's tapped conversations with Mr. A.T.M.M.